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Cristian Pinzón, Martí Navarro, and Javier Bajo* 
Abstract. The availability of services can be comprimised if a service request sent 
to the web services server hides some form of attack within its contents. This  
article presents AIDeM (An Agent-Based Intrusion Detection Mechanism), an 
adaptive solution for dealing with DoS attacks in Web service environments. The 
solution proposes a two phased mechanism in which each phase incorporates a 
special type of CBR-BDI agent that functions as a classifier. In the first phase,  
a case-based reasoning (CBR) engine utilizes a Naïves Bayes strategy to carry out 
an initial filter, and in the second phase, a CBR engine incorporates a neural net-
work to complete the classification mechanism. AIDeM has been applied within 
the FUSION@ architecture to improve its current security mechanism. A proto-
type of the architecture was developed and applied to a case study. The results ob-
tained are presented in this study. 
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1   Introduction 
Security is one of the primary concerns in service oriented architectures (SOA) 
and Web services [1]. Some protective measures such as Web Service Security 
(WSS) [2], WS-Policy [3], WS-Trust [4], etc. focus on authorization and authenti-
cation aspects to ensure confidentiality and integrity. However, they do not con-
template security problems that put the availability of Web services at risk. The 
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emergence of new threats that can interrupt the correct functioning of services is 
closely related to some of the components contained in this technology, such as 
the XML standard used to encode messages, and the hypertext transfer protocol 
(HTTP) used to the communication. Different types of threats, similar to denial of 
service (DOS) attacks, can incapacitate a web service and block access to author-
ized users by sending malicious requests to the web server. 
This study presents AIDeM, an advanced detection method that can confront 
mechanisms or techniques that produce denial of service attacks within Web envi-
ronments. AIDeM is intended to improve the initial security level within the FU-
SION@ architecture [5]. FUSION@ proposes a new and easier method to develop 
distributed intelligent ubiquitous systems, where applications and services can 
communicate in a distributed way with intelligent agents, even from mobile de-
vices, regardless of time and location restrictions. FUSION@ did already include 
a security component within its structure consisting of an agent specialized. How-
ever, the security method employed by this agent is limited in scope making avail-
able services vulnerable to attack. AIDeM is based on a group of agents specially 
designed to work together intelligently and adaptively to solve the problem of the 
reliability of SOAP messages sent in service requests. The core of AIDeM is a 
classification mechanism that incorporates a two-phase strategy to classify SOAP 
messages. The first phase applies an initial filter for detecting simple attacks with-
out requiring an excessive amount of resources. The second phase involves a more 
complex process that ends up using a significantly higher amount of resources. 
Each of the phases incorporates an intelligent agent that integrates a CBR engine 
with advanced classification capabilities. The idea of a CBR mechanism is to ex-
ploit the experience gained from similar problems in the past and then adapt suc-
cessful solutions to the current problem [6]. The first agent uses a Naïves Bayes 
classifier and the second a neural network, each of which is incorporated into the 
respective re-use phase of the CBR cycle. As a result, the system can learn and 
adapt to the attacks and the changes in the techniques used in the attacks. Addi-
tionally, a strategy of a two phased classification mechanism is to use its resources 
(CPU, cycle, memory) and improve response time. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a general de-
scription of the FUSION@ architecture and the limitations of the current mecha-
nism of security. Section 3 focuses on the details of the AIDeM architecture  
and the mechanism of classification. Finally, section 4 describes how the classifier 
agent has been tested inside a multi-agent system and presents the results  
obtained. 
2   FUSION@ Architecture and Current Mechanism of Security  
FUSION@ [5] combines a services-oriented approach with intelligent agents to 
obtain an innovative architecture that facilitates ubiquitous computation and 
communication, and high levels of human-system-environment interaction. It also 
provides an advanced flexibility and customization to easily add, modify or re-
move applications or services on demand, regardless of the programming lan-
guage. FUSION@ framework defines four basic blocks: a) Applications represent 
AIDeM: Agent-Based Intrusion Detection Mechanism 349
 
all the programs that can be used to exploit the system functionalities. They can be 
executed locally or remotely. b) Services represent the activities that the architec-
ture offers. c) Agents Platform is the core of the architecture and integrates a set of 
agents, each one with special characteristics and behaviours. In FUSION@ ser-
vices are managed and coordinated by deliberative BDI agents with distributed 
computation and coordination abilities. d) Communication Protocol allows appli-
cations and services to communicate directly with the agents platform. The  
protocol is completely open and independent of any programming language, fa-
cilitating ubiquitous communication capabilities. This protocol is based on SOAP 
specification [7] to capture all messages between the platform and the services and 
applications. Developers are free to use any programming language. The only  
requirement is that they must follow the communication protocol based on the 
transactions of XML (SOAP) messages. The communication among agents in the 
platform follows the FIPA Agent Communication Language (ACL) specification.  
FUSION@ is a modular multi-agent architecture, where services and applica-
tions are managed and controlled by deliberative BDI (Belief, Desire, Intention) 
agents [8] [9]. There are different kinds of agents in the architecture, each one 
with specific roles, capabilities and characteristics: 
• CommApp Agent. Responsible for all communication between applications 
and the platform.  
• CommServ Agent. Responsible for all communications between services and 
the platform. This agent also periodically checks the status of all services to 
know if they are idle, busy, or crashed. 
• Directory Agent. Manages the list of services that can be used by the system.  
• Supervisor Agent. Supervises the correct functioning of the other agents in the 
system.  
• Security Agent. Analyzes the structure and syntax of all incoming and outgo-
ing XML messages.  
• Admin Agent. Decides which agent must be called by taking the QoS and user 
preferences into account. Admin Agent has a routing list to manage messages 
from all applications and services. This agent also checks if services are 
working properly to ensure that QoS is always current. 
• Interface Agent. This particular agent was designed to be embedded in user 
applications.  
Developers can add new agent types or extend the existing ones to conform to 
their projects needs. However, most of the agents’ functionalities should be mod-
elled as services, releasing them from tasks that could be performed by services. 
More specific details of the architecture can be found in [7].  
Security is considered an important element within the FUSION@ architecture. 
As a result FUSION@ incorporates a security mechanism that validates all incom-
ing messages dealing with service requests. The strategy is centered on the role of 
the Security agent and its attempt to protect services that are facing potential at-
tacks hidden within service requests (embedded within a SOAP message). The se-
curity mechanism contained within the Security agent is simple and efficient for 
known attacks, although it presents a series of limitations when it comes to  
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protecting the architecture and services during a more complex attack. The major-
ity of the attacks made against service based environments use complex tech-
niques that are difficult to detect with a simple XML code review found in the 
SOAP message. One example of a complex attack directed at service based envi-
ronments is the denial of service attack, which can implement many mechanisms 
of attacks within service based environments [1]. A DoS attack causes the re-
sources available in the server of the provider (memory and CPU cycles) to be 
drastically reduced or exhausted while a malicious SOAP message is being parsed. 
In summary, the initial security mechanism incorporated within FUSION@ 
presents the following limitations:  a) It can cause a bottleneck during an instance 
of high service requests and negatively affect the architecture’s performance. b) Its 
strategy can only detect and block a limited number of known attacks, and cannot 
handle attacks that are more complicated in nature. c) The security mechanism is 
incapable of adapting to new attack patterns. This limitation prevents the security 
mechanism from confronting new attacks or fast-paced changes in known attack 
patterns. 
3   AIDeM: Agent-Based Intrusion Detection Mechanism  
AIDeM is based on the incorporation of a new security block composed of a set of 
agents with special capabilities. The new proposed mechanism is based on our 
previous research in SQL injection attacks [10] [11] which developed a multi-
agent SQLMAS architecture. In this way, some resources are reused and the 
knowledge acquired from previous work is adapted in order to provide an evolu-
tion of the mechanism proposed. 
Figure 1 presents the AIDeM architecture. As shown in Figure 1, AIDeM is 
comprised of the Security and Admin agent, both of which were already included  
 
 
Fig. 1 Representation of AIDeM with the set special agents 
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in the FUSION@ architecture, as well as the Traffic agent and two others that will 
function as classifiers: C1 agent and C2 agent. AIDeM was designed as a two 
phased classification mechanism for classifying SOAP messages, as explained by 
[10] and [11]. The first phase applies the initial filter for detecting simple attacks 
without requiring an excessive amount of resources. The second phase involves a 
more complex process which ends up using a significantly higher amount of re-
sources. This two-phased strategy improves the overall response time of the classi-
fication mechanism, facilitating a quick classification of any incoming SOAP 
messages that were thought to contain significant features during the first phase. 
The second phase is executed only for those SOAP messages with complex char-
acteristics identified as suspicious during the first phase and requiring a more  
detailed evaluation. Each of the phases incorporates a CBR-BDI [12] agent with 
reasoning, learning and adaptation capabilities.   
The following section provides a detailed description of the characteristics and 
tasks related to each of the agents that constitute the AIDeM platform. 
• Traffic Agent: This agent has a type of sensor feature that allows it to identify 
and capture SOAP messages that have been sent from external applications 
and that request a particular type of service. The agent captures the messages 
and redirects them to the Security agent for evaluation. 
• Security Agent: This agent carries out tasks similar to those assigned with the 
original FUSION@ security mechanism. The agent is in charge of receiving 
SOAP message that contain service requests. It performs a quick analysis of 
the message, and the data obtained are sent to the agent at the first phase of 
the classification mechanism. With cases that are considered suspicious, the 
Security agent submits the XML message to a more comprehensive syntactic 
analysis in order to obtain the necessary data for carrying out the second 
phase of the classification mechanism. There can be more than one Security 
agent, depending on the amount of workload. 
• Classifier C1 Agent: This is one of the key CBR-BDI agents in the classifica-
tion process. These agents initiate a classification by incorporating a CBR en-
gine that in turn incorporates a Näives Bayes strategy in the re-use phase. The 
main goal of this initial phase is to carry out an effective classification, but 
without requiring an excessive amount of resources. The fields of the case are 
obtained from the headers of the packages of the HTTP/TCP-IP transport pro-
tocol. Table 1 shows the fields taken into consideration to describe the  
problem. 
Table 1 Problem Description First Phase – Classifier C1 Agent 
Fields Type  
IDService Int i 
Subnet mask String m 
SizeMessage Int s 
NTimeRouting Int n 
LengthSOAPAction Int l 
TFMessageSent Int w 
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Within the CBR cycle, specifically in the re-use phase, a particular classifi-
cation strategy is used by applying a Näives Bayes strategy, which gives 3 
possible results: legal, malicious and suspicious. Messages that are classified 
as legal are sent to the corresponding web service for processing. Malicious 
messages are immediately rejected, while suspicious messages continue 
through to the classification process executing the second phase of the classi-
fication mechanism. There can be more than one Classifier C1 agent depend-
ing on the amount of workload. 
• Classifier C2 Agent: This CBR-BDI agent completes the classification 
mechanism. In order to initiate this phase, it is necessary to have previously 
initiated a syntactic analysis on the SOAP message to extract the required 
data. Table 2 presents the fields used in describing the problem for the CBR 
in this layer. Once the data have been extracted from the message, a CBR 
mechanism is initiated by using a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural net-
work in the reuse phase. There can be more than one Classifier C2 agent, de-
pending on the amount of workload. 
Table 2 Problem Description Second Phase – Classifier C2 Agent 
Fields  Type variable 
IDService Int i 
MaskSubnet String m 
SizeMessage Int s 
NTimeRouting Int n 
LengthSOAPAction Int l 
MustUnderstandTrue Boolean u 
NumberHeaderBlock Int h 
NElementsBody Int b 
NestingDepthElements Int d 
NXMLTagRepeated Int t 
NLeafNodesBody Int f 
NAttributesDeclared Int a 
CPUTimeParsing Int c 
SizeKbMemoryParser Int k 
• Admin Agent: In addition to the functions already mentioned in the FUSION@ 
architecture, this agent is responsible for overseeing the correct functioning of 
the classification process and for coordinating the distribution of tasks. 
4   Results and Conclusions  
This article has presented AIDeM, a mechanism for classifying incoming requests 
based on SOAP messages. The mechanism was designed to exploit the distributed 
capacity of the agents. Additionally, an advanced classification mechanism was  
designed to filter incoming SOAP messages. The classification mechanism was 
structured in two phases, each of which includes a special CBR-BDI agent that 
functions as a classifier. The first phase filters simple attacks without exhausting an 
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excessive amount of resources by applying a CBR engine that incorporates a Na-
ïves Bayes strategy. The second phase, a bit more complex and costly, is in charge 
of classifying the SOAP messages that were not classified in the first phase. 
A small case study was used to evaluate the efficacy of the integration of 
AIDeM within the FUSION@ architecture. The ALZ-MAS 2.0 multi-agent sys-
tem [5] was used to carry out the test. It was implemented through FUSION@ and 
used to construct a tool for dependent environments. In order to evaluate AIDeM, 
two specific services available in ALZ-MAS 2.0 were selected for external users: 
RequestScheduleDoctor() which is used to consult the agenda of a doctor via 
Internet and RequestAppointment() which is used to request an appointment with a 
doctor via Internet. 
The experiments were carried out in two stages; the first stage was to obtain the 
test data used for training the classifiers, and the second stage was to evaluate the 
classification mechanism. In order to obtain the test data in the first stage, the Traf-
fic agent was configured to capture the incoming SOAP messages without redirect-
ing them to the services. In order to send the SOAP messages, 3 points (nodes) 
were established, from which various requests for selected services were executed. 
Each of these nodes belonged to a different network, i.e., each node connected to 
the internet using a different IP and subnetwork mask. In the first stage, each node 
was configured with 30 requests (SOAP messages) to be sent to each of the 2  
selected services. Each node sent a total of 60 requests so that the total number of 
requests made by the 3 nodes to the 2 services was equal to 180 requests. The 30 
requests sent by each node, included legal message and malicious message (incor-
rectly formed messages). For the second stage of testing, the number of nodes and 
services was the same as in the first stage, but the number of requests was config-
ured at 15 requests per node. At this stage, once the requests were captured by the 
Traffic agent, they were sent to AIDeM to be evaluated and classified. A total of 90 
requests (legal and malicious) were sent to AIDeM for evaluation. Figure 2 shows 
the results obtained for the set of SOAP messages evaluated.  
 
Fig. 2 Effectiveness of the classification mechanism prototype according to the number of 
patterns 
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Figure 2 shows the percentage of prediction with regards to the number of pat-
terns (SOAP messages) for the classification mechanism. It is clear that as the 
number of patterns increases, the success rate of prediction also increases in terms 
of percentage. This is influenced by the fact that we are working with CBR sys-
tems, which depend on a larger amount of data stored in the memory of cases.  
Future works are expected to develop the tools for obtaining a complete  
solution.  
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